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THE BROWNFIELDS ACTION AGENDA: A
MODEL FOR FUTURE FEDERAL/STATE
COOPERATION IN THE QUEST FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE?
Stephen M. Johnson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, the federal government has responded to
environmental crises in a circuitous, or even haphazard,
manner. The development of the Clean Water Act, Clean Air
Act, and many of the major pollution control laws have fol-
lowed pendulum-like journeys originating with a laissez-faire
federal attitude and ending in comprehensive federal regula-
tion.1 Historically, once the federal government identified an
environmental crisis, such as polluted lakes and streams, it
began to address the problem by conducting research on the
problem or providing funds to states or individuals to conduct
research. Simultaneously, or shortly thereafter, the federal
government affirmatively limited the activities that it took
which contributed to the problem.
In the early stages of its response to most crises, though,
the federal government was reluctant to impose similar lim-
its on the private sector. Instead, the government often pro-
vided funding to states or individuals to address the problem
at a local level. When the state and local measures failed,
due to the interstate nature of pollution, among other rea-
sons, the federal government responded with a massive regu-
latory program. Recently, however, the pendulum is revers-
ing its motion, and the federal government is being pressured
* Associate Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law. B.S., J.D.
Villanova University. LL.M. George Washington University School of Law.
1. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, LAW, SCIENCE
AND POLICY 103-12 (1992). For a good discussion of the development of the
Clean Air Act in this manner, see John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism
under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183 (1995).
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to return power to the states to address environmental
problems.2
One of the most pervasive environmental crises that
faces society today is environmental injustice. The crisis has
been well-documented in the press and in academic circles.3
The inequities are legion. Studies indicate that hazardous
waste landfills and treatment facilities, and industries that
emit the greatest amounts of toxic chemicals, have been sited
predominantly in minority or low-income communities.4
Studies also suggest that the federal government is bringing
enforcement actions under environmental laws, and making
cleanup decisions under Superfund, in a discriminatory
manner.
5
2. Recent Supreme Court decisions directly or indirectly restrict the fed-
eral government's regulatory powers. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S.
Ct. 1624 (1995); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). Congress is also taking steps to limit the
federal government's regulatory powers. In early 1995, Congress enacted the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, which requires the federal govern-
ment to pay for any mandate that the government imposes on state, local or
tribal governments that costs more than $50 million per year. See 2 U.S.C.
§ 1501 (West Supp. 1994). Legislators have introduced dozens of other bills
that would severely restrict federal environmental regulation. See Stephen M.
Johnson, United States v. Lopez: A Misstep, but Hardly Epochal for Federal
Environmental Regulation, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL L.J. 33 (1996).
3. For a brief bibliography of recent law review articles, see Eileen Gauna,
Federal Environmental Citizen Provisions: Obstacles and Incentives on the
Road to Environmental Justice, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 6 n.22 (1995). See also Rob-
ert W. Colin, Review of Legal Literature on Environmental Racism, Environ-
mental Equity, and Environmental Justice, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 121 (1994).
For a cross-disciplinary bibliography, see Michael Meuser & Dr. Andrew Szasz,
Environmental Inequality Bibliography (visited Mar. 23, 1996) <http'i/
www.cruzio.com/-meuser/ejwww.html>.
4. See Paul Mohai, The Demographics of Dumping Revisited: Examining
the Impact of Alternate Methodologies in Environmental Justice Research, 14
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 615 (1995); BENJAMIN A. GOLDMAN & LAURA FITTON, Toxic
WASTES AND RACE REVISITED: AN UPDATE OF THE 1987 REPORT ON THE RACIAL
AND SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS
WASTE SITES 14-15 (1994); UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST COMMISSION FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE, Toxic WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES (1987); U.S. GEN. AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELA-
TION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES (1983)
(including a summary of 10 recent studies that focus on disparate siting of haz-
ardous waste facilities in poor or minority communities). See also Dr. Andrew
Szasz & Michael R. Meuser, Environmental Inequality in Santa Clara County
(visited Feb. 27, 1996) <http://www.cruzio.com/-meuser/EI/project.html> (using
data from the Toxics Release Inventory to examine the siting of industrial facil-
ities in Santa Clara County).
5. See Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial
Divide in Environmental Law, NAT'L. L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S1, S1-12; Rae
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Air quality in minority and low-income communities is
worse than in other communities.6 The federal government
establishes regulations under a variety of environmental
laws to protect persons from exposure to hazardous levels of
toxic substances based on assumptions that may not protect
various ethnic or racial communities.' Furthermore, new
market-based pollution trading schemes under the Clean Air
Act and the Clean Water Act may create toxic hot spots that
disparately impact low-income or minority communities.8
The federal government seems to be responding to envi-
ronmental injustice in the same manner that it has tradition-
ally responded to environmental crises. First, the govern-
ment is imposing some limits on the actions that it takes that
contribute to environmental injustice, but it is not placing
any limits on private actors. President Clinton's Executive
Order 12898 requires federal agencies to identify dispropor-
tionate impacts that federal programs or activities may have
on minority and low-income communities, and requires agen-
cies to develop strategies to address environmental injustice.9
Legislation that would limit the siting of landfills or require
distributional factors to be considered in private decision-
making, on the other hand, has died in Congress.' °
Zimmerman, Social Equity and Environmental Risk, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 6, 20
(Dec. 1, 1993); UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNI-
TIES OF COLOR (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994). In a recent report to EPA, the
National Environmental Justice Advisory Committee recommended that "EPA
should undertake a series of highly visible, focused enforcement initiatives that
prominently place environmental justice concerns at the top of the agency's list
of environmental priorities" in order to "demonstrate EPA's good faith and seri-
ousness of purpose." Increased Enforcement Recommended in Minority, Low-
Income Communities, 26 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1554 (Dec. 22, 1995).
6. See Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing Environmental Justice: The Distribu-
tional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787, 797 (1993);
see also Environmental Justice: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights, 103d Cong. (1993) (statement of Paul Mohai); D.R.
Wernette & L.A. Nieves, Breathing Polluted Air, E.P.A. J., Mar.- Apr. 1992, at
16.
7. See Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of Quan-
titative Risk Assessment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 103 (1996); Lazarus, supra note 6,
at 846.
8. See Daniel P. Selmi, Experimentation and the New Environmental Law,
27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1061, 1071 (1994).
9. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994) [hereinafter EO
12898].
10. See, e.g., S. 1161, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 2488, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R.
2105, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 1924, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 5326, 102d Cong.
(1992); S. 2806, 102d Cong. (1992).
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Consistent with the traditional response to environmen-
tal crises, the federal government is also providing funding,
through grants and loans, to public and private institutions
and communities to address environmental justice issues.1
Furthermore, the federal government is conducting or fund-
ing research on environmental justice issues. 2
However, given the current political climate, it is un-
likely that the federal government will take the traditional
approach to environmental crises and implement a massive
regulatory program to eliminate environmental injustice. It
is also unlikely that the federal government will leave the cri-
sis to the states, although some state law remedies are pro-
viding greater opportunities to achieve environmental justice
than federal remedies.' 3
Further steps must be taken in order to address the
problem of environmental injustice. This article explores
whether those steps should be taken by the federal govern-
ment or state governments, or some combination of both.
11. See, e.g., Environmental Justice Community/University Partnership
Grants Program, 60 Fed. Reg. 62,436 (1995); Environmental Justice Small
Grants to Community-Based/Grassroots Organizations and Tribal Govern-
ments, 60 Fed. Reg. 62,432 (1995); Environmental Justice Through Pollution
Prevention Grants, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,063 (1996).
12. Executive Order 12,298 requires federal agencies (to the extent permit-
ted by law) to collect, maintain and analyze information assessing and compar-
ing environmental and human health risks borne by populations identified by
race, national origin or income. EO 12898, supra note 9, § 3-302(a). The Order
stresses the importance of collecting, maintaining and analyzing such informa-
tion regarding communities surrounding sites that become the subject of a sub-
stantial federal environmental, administrative or judicial action, id. § 3-302(b),
or communities surrounding federal facilities. Id. § 3-302(c). In addition, the
Order requires that "[e]nvironmental human health research, whenever practi-
cable and appropriate, shall include diverse segments of the population in epi-
demiological and clinical studies, including segments at high risk from environ-
mental hazards, such as minority populations, low-income populations and
workers who may be exposed to substantial environmental hazards." Id. § 3-
301.
13. See, e.g., Peter L. Reich, Greening the Ghetto: A Theory of Environmen-
tal Race Discrimination, 41 KAN. L. REV. 271 (1992). Reich points out that, due
to differences between the U.S. Constitution and state constitutions, minority
communities may be more likely to prevail in equal protection challenges to
disparate siting of hazardous waste facilities based on state constitutions than
they have been in challenges based on the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 313. In
addition, Reich notes that state environmental protection acts might be used to
increase public participation and require consideration of socioeconomic factors
in environmental decisionmaking in ways that the National Environmental
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321-70 (1994), cannot be used.
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II. THE NEED FOR STATE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
INITIATIVES
A federal response to the crisis of environmental injus-
tice unaccompanied by a corresponding state effort would be
futile. State involvement is essential because states regulate
or take many of the actions that disparately impact minority
and low-income communities. In many cases, states are the
primary actors, to the exclusion of the federal government.
For instance, much of the discourse on environmental in-
justice focuses on the disproportionate siting of hazardous
waste facilities and hazardous industries. 14 However, those
siting decisions are intrinsically local land use decisions, and
the federal government has traditionally been reluctant to
regulate land use planning and other local government mat-
ters.15 In fact, the Supreme Court's recent decision in United
States v. Lopez16 suggests that federal regulation of such local
activities may be vulnerable to Commerce Clause challenges.
Accordingly, state initiatives to prevent inequitable siting of
hazardous facilities must be a central component of a na-
tional environmental justice strategy.
Similarly, differences in air quality in different parts of
the country can often be traced to different controls that
states place on persons and industries in different air quality
control regions in the state. EPA gives states broad discretion
to fashion plans to meet national ambient air quality stan-
dards, and the agency is reluctant to impose specific trans-
portation controls or other controls on states that would limit
land use.1 7 Once again, since the federal government exer-
cises limited control over those decisions, states must take
the lead in establishing programs to prevent inequitable dis-
tribution of air pollution.
States are also essential partners in the struggle to
achieve environmental justice in the cleanup of hazardous
waste sites. While studies have suggested that hazardous
substances are cleaned up more slowly, and less permanent
remedies are chosen more often in minority communities,
those studies have focused on cleanups under the federal
14. See sources cited, supra, note 4.
15. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 29.
16. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1994).
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Superfund law.' 8 Very few sites are cleaned up under the
federal Superfund law, as compared to those that are cleaned
up under state Superfund laws.' 9 Reform of the federal
Superfund process will, therefore, only address potential en-
vironmental injustice at a small percentage of the hazardous
sites that are cleaned up nationally each year. In addition,
when the federal government cleans up hazardous sites
under the Superfund law, it must incorporate state standards
when it chooses the appropriate cleanup method for the
site.20 For both of these reasons, state laws that ensure ade-
quate community participation in the selection and imple-
mentation of remedies for state Superfund sites, and that es-
tablish cleanup standards that protect all communities
equally must be an important component of a national envi-
ronmental justice strategy.
Finally, any effort to combat discriminatory or inequita-
ble enforcement of environmental laws will be doomed to fail-
ure unless it focuses on enforcement by state government, as
well as the federal government. The Clean Water Act, RCRA,
and most of the federal environmental laws include provi-
sions that authorize the EPA to delegate primary authority to
state governments to administer and enforce major portions
of those laws.2' State governments, rather than the federal
government, administer and enforce most of the hazardous
waste and clean water permitting programs in the country.22
Therefore, enforcement decisions under those programs are
being made primarily by states, rather than the federal
government.23
In the future, states will play an ever larger role in pro-
tecting low-income and minority communities. The federal
government is moving away from the "one-size fits all," "com-
18. See sources cited, supra note 5.
19. DAVID R. BERZ ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN REAL ESTATE AND Busi-
NESS TRANSACTIONS § 4.01 (1995).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(2) (1994).
21. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, E.P.A. AND THE STATES: ENVIRONMEN-
TAL CHALLENGES REQUIRE A BETTER WORKING RELATIONSHIP 2 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter E.P.A. AND THE STATES]. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 6926(b), 7661a(d) (1994); 33
U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1994).
22. E.P.A AND THE STATES, supra note 21, at 2.
23. However, the federal government retains the right to bring enforcement
actions in those states as long as the federal government notifies the state prior
to bringing the enforcement actions. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1987); 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928 (1994).
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mand and control" regulatory approach that it has taken to-
ward environmental crises in the past.24 Instead, many of
the new federal environmental initiatives, such as watershed
planning and effluent trading in watersheds, rely on states as
central partners to prepare, or aid the federal government in
preparing, individual control strategies that address the spe-
cific needs and problems of discrete geographic regions.
25 If
states do not consider distributional issues when they de-
velop such individual control strategies, it is likely that efflu-
ent trading and other economic-based initiatives may perpet-
uate the inequitable distribution of pollution among low-
income and minority communities.
Because state initiatives to ensure environmental justice
are an essential part of a national environmental justice
strategy, it is imperative that, to the extent that a state has
developed an effective strategy for achieving environmental
justice with regard to activities that are normally outside of
the federal government's primary regulatory jurisdiction, the
federal government should encourage states to develop such
programs and not interfere with the state's administration of
their programs.
III. THE NEED FOR FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
INITIATIVES
For several reasons, environmental justice reform is not
an issue that can be left solely to the states. First, as noted
above, many of the existing environmental injustices are
caused, at least in part, by federal actions.26 State programs
and initiatives cannot remedy injustices that are caused by
the federal government. In order to achieve environmental
justice on a national level, reforms must begin with the fed-
eral government.
Additionally, environmental justice reform cannot be left
to the states because it is unlikely that the states will uni-
24. See Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-
Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 298-307 (1996); Donald T. Hornstein, Les-
sons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms and Politics of Envi-
ronmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 373-85 (1993).
25. See A Framework for Watershed-Based Trading, 61 Fed. Reg. 29,563
(1996); Effluent Trading in Watersheds Policy Statement, 61 Fed. Reg. 4994
(1996); Louise Wise, The Clean Water Act: New Directions, Remarks at ABA
Satellite Seminar (Jan. 18, 1996).
26. See supra notes 5-8.
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formly initiate programs to prevent inequitable distribution
of pollution. Absent federal controls, states are likely to pur-
sue the traditional "race to the regulatory bottom," and im-
pose the minimal limitations on businesses that are politi-
cally acceptable in order to attract economic development.27
Furthermore, in light of the fact that several states are
attempting to eliminate affirmative action programs 28 and
that several states have recently enacted laws that prohibit
state governments from providing translated notices of im-
portant health and safety information,29 it is unlikely that
state governments will lead an aggressive campaign to en-
sure environmental justice for low-income or minority com-
munities. If environmental justice reform is left to the states,
it may be ignored.
Finally, environmental justice reform cannot be left to
the states because many environmental injustices involve in-
terstate or international disputes or pollution problems that
can only be remedied through federal action. 0
27. The "race to the bottom" phenomenon has been described in ZYGMUNT
J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW AND SOCI-
ETY 776 (1992); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Re-
thinking the 'Race to the Bottom' Rationale for Federal Environmental Regula-
tion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1212 (1992); Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and
Rights, 19 GA. L. REV. 917 (1985).
28. See William Claiborne, Affirmative Action Curbed in California; Gover-
nor Signs Order Eliminating Programs, WASH. POST, June 2, 1995, at Al; Geor-
gia Colleges Ordered to Drop Racial Preferences, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 1996, at
A20; Kathryn Wexler, Womens Groups Take on California Initiative; Nation-
wide Support Bolsters Efforts to Preserve Affirmative Action, WASH. POST, Mar.
3, 1996, at A3.
29. Twenty-three states have enacted laws that designate English as the
official language for the state. Maria Puente, Defining the One-Nation, One-
Language Principle, USA TODAY, Mar. 26, 1996, at 7A. Many of those laws
prohibit the state from translating documents into other languages. Id.
30. The most notorious example of environmental irustice which cannot be
resolved by states alone is the environmental crisis in the communities sur-
rounding the maquilladoras along the Mexican border. See Jack Lewis, The
U.S. Colonias: A Target for Aid, EPA J., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 61. See also Ronald
A. Taylor, Pollution Fighter on U.S. Embassy Roster in Mexico, WASH. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 1991, at A5; Cecile Holmes White, Hands Across the Border, Hous.
CHRON., May 15, 1993, at 1.
On the domestic front, while pollution does not recognize interstate bound-
aries, the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution limits the power of a state
to regulate pollution that arises in a neighboring state, but which causes or
contributes to environmental injustice in the state. Only the federal govern-
ment can act to prevent such injustice.
[Vol. 37
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IV. PRINCIPLES FOR COOPERATIVE FEDERAJJSTATE
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE INITIATIVES
While the federal government must take the lead in
crafting and implementing a national environmental justice
strategy, it should model its initiatives on successful environ-
mental justice programs that have been created in the states.
At the same time, the federal government should continue to
provide funding and technical expertise to states and local
governments to encourage them to develop innovative pro-
grams to achieve environmental justice, which may be models
for future federal initiatives.
The following principles should, therefore, guide the fed-
eral government in its response to the crisis of environmental
injustice: (1) The federal government must take affirmative
steps to remove any barriers that it has created to environ-
mental justice; (2) To the extent that states or local govern-
ments have developed effective strategies to achieve environ-
mental justice, the federal government should encourage
them to pursue those strategies and take steps to enable
them to pursue those strategies, as long as they don't conflict
with overriding federal policies; (3) The federal government
should adopt successful state environmental justice initia-
tives on the federal level, and make legislative and regulatory
changes based on those successful initiatives; (4) The federal
government should continue to support state and local envi-
ronmental justice initiatives by providing funding, technical
expertise and research assistance for those initiatives.
The federal government is following these principles in
implementing EPA's Brownfields Action Agenda,3 1 which is
being praised by the environmental community, businesses,
and many civil rights leaders as a positive initiative in the
fight for environmental justice.32 The remainder of this arti-
cle illustrates the manner in which the federal government is
applying those principles in the Brownfields Action Agenda.
The partnership that the federal and state governments are
31. EPA announced its Brownfields Action Agenda, a series of actions that
were designed to encourage brownfield redevelopment, on January 25, 1995.
U.S. E.P.A., Brownfields Action Agenda (visited Jan. 25, 1995) <http://
www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/ascii/action.txt.> [hereinafter BAA].
32. John Holusha, EPA Helping Cities to Revive Industrial Sites, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 1995, at Al; Gary Lee, Breathing New Life into Brownfields; In-
centives Lure Firms to Contaminated Sites, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 1996, at A4;
John Chambers, All Things Considered (National Public Radio, June 17, 1996).
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forging to encourage brownfield redevelopment could be a
model for further federal/state environmental justice
initiatives.
V. THE BROWNFIELD ACTION AGENDA AS A MODEL FOR
COOPERATIVE FEDERAIJSTATE ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE INITIATIVES
A. What are Brownfields and Why is Brownfield
Redevelopment an Environmental Justice Issue?
EPA defines brownfields as "abandoned, idled or under-
used industrial and commercial facilities where expansion or
redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived environ-
mental contamination."33 The public probably recognizes
brownfields as the abandoned factories or industrial com-
plexes that exist in most cities and urban centers, although
brownfields can also be found in the suburbs. The United
States General Accounting Office estimates that there may be
as many as 500,000 brownfields in the United States, and
that it could cost $650 billion to clean up those properties. 34
Brownfields vary greatly in the degree of hazard that they
pose to society.35 However, the term "brownfield" does not
encompass sites that are so hazardous that they would be in-
cluded on the National Priorities List under Superfund, or on
similar state priority lists.
3 6
33. U.S. E.P.A., Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response,
Brownfields Frequently Asked Questions (visited May 23, 1996) <http:ll
www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/answers.htm#l>. The Office of Technology Assess-
ment defines brownfields as "land and/or buildings that are abandoned or un-
derutilized where expansion or redevelopment is complicated, in part, because
of the threat of known or potential contamination." OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY As-
SESSMENT, THE STATE OF THE STATES ON BROWNFIELDS: PROGRAMS FOR CLEANUP
AND REUSE OF CONTAMINATED SITES 1 (1995) [hereinafter OTA REPORT].
34. Anne Slaughter Andrew, Brownfield Redevelopment: A State-Led Re-
form of Superfund Liability, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T. 27 (1996). The Office
of Technology Assessment estimates that there may be up to 450,000 brown-
field sites. OTA REPORT, supra note 33, at 2. There are over 2000 brownfield
sites in the City of Chicago alone. Id. at 4.
35. "Information on the level of contamination of brownfields is limited,
though sites are known to have anywhere from zero, low, or moderate contami-
nation to extremely hazardous conditions, while many sites have not been eval-
uated." OTA REPORT, supra note 33, at 2.
36. Id. at 2; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SUPERFUND: BARRIERS
TO BROWNFIELD REDEVELOPMENT 2 (1996) [hereinafter GAO SUPERFUND
REPORT].
[Vol. 37
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For several reasons described below, land owners and de-
velopers are reluctant to redevelop these contaminated or po-
tentially contaminated urban areas. Instead, developers
often choose to build on suburban or rural farmland or open
areas where there has been no prior commercial or industrial
activity ("greenfields"). 37  The threat of contamination is
lower at greenfields than brownfields. 38 The trend toward de-
velopment of greenfields, as opposed to redevelopment of
brownfields, encourages suburban sprawl, increased traffic
congestion, and habitat destruction.39 It also stunts economic
growth in urban areas.4 °
Over the last few years, brownfield redevelopment has
become an important environmental justice issue, as well as
an important environmental issue. Many brownfields are lo-
cated in poor or minority communities. 41 Their presence
often stagnates economic development.42 Redevelopment of
the brownfield properties, on the other hand, creates jobs, im-
proves the communities' tax base, and can spur additional
economic development.4 3
Brownfield redevelopment in poor and minority commu-
nities also provides environmental benefits to those commu-
nities. Contaminated properties that may have been creating
health and safety concerns are cleaned up when brownfields
are redeveloped. 44 The communities benefit from reduced ex-
posure to environmental contaminants. In recognition of
these economic and environmental benefits, the Director of
the NAACP's Environmental Justice Program recently
37. U.S. E.P.A., Region 5, Brownfields: Quickview of Key Issues: What are
Brownfields? (visited Apr. 9, 1996) <http://www.epa.gov/Region5/brown/keyis-
sues/quick.html#what>. [hereinafter Region 5 Quickview].
38. Region 5 Quickview, supra note 37.
39. Id. See also OTA REPORT, supra note 33, at 4-5.
40. Region 5 Quickview, supra note 37.
41. Id. See also OTA REPORT, supra note 33, at 4.
42. OTA REPORT, supra note 33, at 4.
43. U.S. E.P.A., Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response,
Brownfields Frequently Asked Questions - Question #2 (visited May 23, 1996)
<http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/answers.htm#2>. [hereinafter FAQ2]. Most
brownfield properties are conveniently located near roads, water and sewer
lines, and other necessary infrastructure features. Andrew, supra note 34, at
27. Revitalization of brownfields can spur redevelopment of other nearby
properties that are served by the same infrastructure. Id.
44. E. Lynn Grayson, Brownfields and Environmental Justice: Conflicting
Initiatives?, ABA SEC. NAT. RESOURCES, ENERGY & ENVTL L. NEWSLETTER, Jan.-
Feb. 1996, at 6; see also FAQ2, supra note 43; Andrew, supra note 34, at 27.
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praised brownfield redevelopment as "10 steps" toward envi-
ronmental justice.45
There is, however, a potential conflict between brown-
field redevelopment and environmental justice. State govern-
ments often encourage landowners to redevelop brownfields
by streamlining the environmental cleanup process for
brownfields, or by establishing site-specific cleanup stan-
dards for the property based on the future use of the prop-
erty.46 Some critics argue that the community surrounding a
redeveloped brownfield is being forced to accept a lower level
of protection for health and safety in exchange for economic
development. 47 EPA argues, on the other hand, that even if
cleanup standards are set for brownfields on a site-specific
basis, those cleanup standards must, at a minimum, protect
human health.48 Without a brownfields initiative, it is un-
likely that the properties would be cleaned up at all. In addi-
tion, the agency notes that brownfields, by their nature, are
marginally contaminated properties. 49
While environmental justice activists recognize the po-
tential conflict between brownfield redevelopment and envi-
ronmental justice, many believe that redevelopment can be
accomplished in an environmentally just manner as long as:
(1) the community surrounding a brownfield is informed
about the proposed cleanup and redevelopment as early in
the process as possible, and the community is allowed to par-
ticipate fully in the decisionmaking process; 50 and (2) the site
45. John Rosenthal, Remarks in the ABA Satellite Seminar, Brownfields
Redevelopment: Cleaning Up the Urban Environment (Mar. 7, 1996) [hereinaf-
ter Rosenthal Interview]. In Toxic Waste and Race Revisited, the United
Church of Christ's Commission for Racial Justice identified community revitali-
zation as an important part of any effective solution to the problem of environ-
mental injustice. Grayson, supra note 44.
46. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
47. Grayson, supra note 44; see also Georgette C. Poindexter, Addressing
Morality in Urban Redevelopment: Using Stakeholder Theory to Craft Legal
Process, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 37, 63 (1995).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. John Rosenthal, Change Cleanup Standards If and Only If, THE ENVTL
FORUM, May-June 1995, at 34. See also Poindexter, supra note 47. As the Di-
rector of the NAACP's Environmental Justice Program notes, "Environmental
justice is a process and not an outcome. It is achieved by communities fostering
meaningful and intelligent participation in environmental decisions that affect
their children, their homes, their health, and their jobs." Rosenthal, supra note
50, at 33. In order for a community to be able to participate intelligently, it
must understand the process for cleaning up a site, and must understand the
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is cleaned up to a level that protects human health and the
environment. 51 Most of the state initiatives described below
incorporate these protections.
B. Why is a Cooperative Federal/State Program Necessary
to Achieve "Environmentally Just" Brownfield
Redevelopment?
Before the federal government or state governments took
steps to encourage brownfield redevelopment, very few
brownfields were redeveloped. Uncertain liability and sev-
eral other major impediments discouraged landowners from
redeveloping brownfields.52 State governments have taken
the lead in removing those impediments but a cooperative
federal effort is essential. The following section of this article
explores the impediments to brownfield redevelopment and
state programs that attempt to address those issues. The
section also discusses the limits of the states' powers, and
identifies areas where the federal government must act to en-
courage "environmentally just" brownfield redevelopment.
1. Impediments to Brownfield Redevelopment
The major impediment to brownfield redevelopment is
the uncertain, but potentially substantial, liability that de-
velopers may incur by redeveloping a site.53 If there has been
a release or potential release of hazardous substances at a
brownfield, a developer could be held jointly and severally lia-
ble for the entire cost of cleaning up the site under the federal
Superfund law5 4 or similar state Superfund laws, if the devel-
oper purchases the property or redevelops the property.
issues involved in cleaning up a site. Id. Consequently, communities must
have more access to information about risk assessment, reduced cleanup stan-
dards, and similar issues. Id.
51. Rosenthal, supra note 50, at 34.
52. See infra notes 53-71 and accompanying text.
53. OTA REPORT, supra note 33, at 1-2; Andrew, supra note 34, at 27.
"Even abandoned properties with no contamination can suffer from the stigma
of brownfields until a site assessment determines that it is clean." OTA RE-
PORT, supra note 33, at 4.
54. Superfund imposes joint and several liability on current owners or oper-
ators of property from which there has been a release or threatened release of
hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1996). See, e.g., O'Neill v.
Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (lst Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990). Current
owners and operators can be held liable for the entire cost of cleaning up the
property. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A),(B) (1996).
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While brownfields are usually not hazardous enough to
be placed on the National Priorities List or similar State pri-
orities lists, cleanups under federal or state Superfund laws55
could still cost millions of dollars. If the developer does not
already own the site, they may be reluctant to develop the
site and expose themselves to such liability. 6 Similarly, cur-
rent owners of brownfields where there has not been a release
of hazardous substances may be reluctant to redevelop the
property because they fear that redevelopment will cause a
release which could trigger federal or state Superfund liabil-
ity. In addition to the federal and state Superfund laws,
RCRA and other federal and state environmental laws may
impose liability on persons who purchase or redevelop con-
taminated properties.5
Liability concerns deter not only potential purchasers of
brownfields; they may also deter sellers.5 ' Even if cleaned up
in compliance with all applicable federal and state environ-
mental laws, further contamination may be discovered at the
site after the owner sells the property. Under federal and
state Superfund laws the former owner may have continuing
liability if the contamination can be traced to substances that
were disposed of on the property during the time they owned
it. 59
Former owners may also be liable in toxic tort suits
brought by neighbors of the property or workers on the prop-
55. Approximately 45 states have enacted State Superfund laws, and many
of those laws contain liability provisions that are similar to the Federal
Superfund law. OTA REPORT, supra note 33, at 2, 10. States often focus their
attention under State Superfund laws on sites that are not on the National
Priorities List, and are not being cleaned up under the federal program. Id.
State Superfund laws create the same liability concerns for potential brownfield
redevelopers as the Federal Superfund law. Id. See also Andrew, supra note
34, at 27.
56. OTA REPORT, supra note 33, at 1-3. Although Federal Superfund law
creates an affirmative defense to liability for an innocent landowner, see 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601(35), 9607(b)(3) (1996), the defense is not available to persons
who know, or had reason to know when they bought the property, that hazard-
ous substances were disposed of on the property. Id. § 9601(35)(A). As a result,
the defense is not available to many persons who plan to redevelop brownfields.
57. OTA REPORT, supra note 33, at 6; see also Andrew, supra note 34, at 27.
58. Robert Frantz, Remarks at ABA Satellite Seminar, Brownlields Rede-
velopment: Cleaning Up the Urban Environment (Mar. 7, 1996) [hereinafter
Frantz remarks]. See also GAO SUPERFUND REPORT, supra note 36, at 6.
59. Superfund imposes liability on persons who owned or operated property
at the time hazardous substances were disposed on the property. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(2) (1996).
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erty, and could be a particularly attractive target if the cur-
rent owner is financially troubled.6 0 In addition, if the cur-
rent owner of the property has established a business on the
property, the former owner may find it difficult to clean up if
the cleanup plans interfere with the operations of that busi-
ness.61 Owners of brownfields may be unwilling to relinquish
control over the properties while opening themselves up to
such liability.
Uncertain cleanup standards are another major impedi-
ment to brownfield redevelopment. Prospective developers
are often reluctant to purchase or redevelop brownfields be-
cause they can't predict the level of cleanup that will be re-
quired for the property under federal or state Superfund
laws.62 If the developer can't predict the cleanup levels, they
will not be able to predict how much the cleanup will cost, or
how long it will take.63 Accordingly, they can't determine
whether the redevelopment will be economically viable.
Inadequate or nonexistent financing opportunities also
frustrate brownfield redevelopment. One of the major rea-
sons that private and public institutions have been reluctant
to fund brownfield redevelopment is that they fear Superfund
liability for the cleanup of the property if they finance the re-
development. A 1990 decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the 11th Circuit, United States v. Fleet Factors
Corp. ,64 has created uncertainty regarding the extent to
which a secured creditor can be held liable under Superfund
as the "owner" of the property it has financed. 65 EPA at-
tempted to alleviate that uncertainty by promulgating regu-
lations that created a "safe harbor" for secured lenders,6 6 but
60. Frantz Remarks, supra note 58.
61. Id.
62. OTA REPORT, supra note 33, at 5.
63. Id. at 5, 6.
64. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991).
65. Although Superfund defines "owner" to exclude anyone "who, without
participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of owner-
ship primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility," 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(20)(A)(iii) (1994), the Fleet Factors court held that a secured creditor can
be held liable as an "owner" if its "involvement with the management of the
facility is sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could affect hazard-
ous waste disposal decisions if it so chose." Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at
1558.
66. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt 300).
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the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit struck down those regulations in 1994.67
Even if the Superfund liability of secured creditors was
clearly demarked, private and public institutions would still
be reluctant to fund brownfield redevelopment in many cases
because costs associated with cleaning up the property may
be so high that it would be impossible to redevelop the site
profitably." In some cases, even the cost of assessing the ex-
tent of contamination on a brownfield may be higher than the
profit that the developer could make by cleaning up and
redeveloping the property.6 9 Many creditors are unwilling to
take the risk of investing in redevelopment of a brownfield, or
even investing in the assessment of contamination at a
brownfield, despite the fact that the assessment may disclose
minimal contamination and the actual cleanup costs may be
low.
If, despite all of those impediments, a landowner or de-
veloper proceeds with brownfield development, they may en-
counter one other major impediment. If the landowner or de-
veloper does not involve the community that will be affected
by the redevelopment in the decisionmaking process regard-
ing cleanup and redevelopment of the property, community
opposition may be a major impediment to redevelopment.7 °
Many brownfield redevelopers are beginning to realize that
the project may not succeed unless the affected community is
involved from the beginning of the decisionmaking process
until the completion of the redevelopment. 71 More impor-
tantly, full and informed community participation is neces-
sary to ensure that the cleanup and redevelopment will be
done in a manner that protects and empowers the affected
community.
67. Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The Kelley Court held
that EPA did not have the authority to issue substantive regulations to inter-
pret a statute establishing liability. Id. at 1106.
68. OTA REPORT, supra note 33, at 8.
69. Id. at 18.
70. Id. at 9; see also GAO SUPERFUND REPORT, supra note 36, at 8.
71. Thomas W. Devine, Remarks at ABA Satellite Seminar, Brownfields
Redevelopment: Cleaning Up the Urban Environment (Mar. 7, 1996) [hereinaf-
ter Devine remarks].
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2. State Brownfields Initiatives
Because most brownfield sites do not present a sufficient
threat to human health or the environment to warrant imme-
diate attention under the federal Superfund program, states
have taken the lead in cleaning up brownfield sites.72 In or-
der to overcome the impediments to redevelopment outlined
above, states have also taken the lead in developing initia-
tives that encourage brownfield redevelopment.7" While
states have attempted to encourage brownfield redevelop-
ment through state Superfund laws and property transfer
laws, the most successful vehicles for brownfield redevelop-
ment have been state voluntary cleanup laws.74
Cleanups under a state voluntary cleanup program are,
as the name suggests, voluntary. The process begins when
the owner or developer of a contaminated site approaches the
state government and cooperatively develops a cleanup plan
for the site with the government.75 Minnesota developed the
first voluntary cleanup program in 1988,76 and many other
states have implemented similar programs.7 7
State voluntary cleanup programs attempt to encourage
brownfield redevelopment by removing or reducing the im-
pediments to redevelopment. 78 For instance, many state vol-
untary cleanup laws include provisions that authorize the
72. OTA REPORT, supra note 33, at 2.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 10. The voluntary cleanup programs offer technical assistance,
financial assistance, and liability protection that states cannot generally offer
through State Superfund laws. Id. at 3.
75. Id. at 13. Many state voluntary cleanup programs are not limited to
brownfields, and allow persons to voluntarily remediate State Superfund sites
as well as brownfields.
76. Id. at 19.
77. At the time that the Office of Technology Assessment prepared its State
of the States on Brownfields report, there were 21 state voluntary cleanup pro-
grams. Id. at 3. The Midwestern States in EPA Region 5 (Minnesota, Illinois,
Michigan, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Ohio) are at the forefront in cleaning up
sites under voluntary cleanup programs. Andrew, supra note 34, at 28.
78. In many cases, the cleanup process is also streamlined by reducing gov-
ernment oversight of the process. Andrew, supra note 34, at 28. In some cases,
the state does not review the progress of a voluntary cleanup until the devel-
oper has completed the cleanup. See, e.g., 1995 Pa. Laws 2, §§ 302, 303. In
other cases, the State certifies an environmental professional to oversee the
cleanup, and the State does not review the cleanup until it has been completed.
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.10 (Anderson 1996). Some states, how-
ever, oversee all phases of the cleanup process. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 115B.175 (West 1995).
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state to enter into a covenant not to sue the developer or pro-
visions that otherwise protect a developer from future liabil-
ity for contamination at a voluntary cleanup site if the devel-
oper successfully conducts the voluntary cleanup that is
chosen by the developer and the state government for the
site.7 9 Some state programs also waive the liability of pro-
spective purchasers of contaminated property to encourage
developers to buy and redevelop brownfields,80 and several
state programs include provisions to limit the liability of se-
cured creditors."'
State voluntary cleanup programs also use flexible
cleanup standards to lower the cost of cleanups and en-
79. Andrew, supra note 34, at 28. Minnesota's voluntary investigation and
cleanup program protects developers who complete an approved voluntary
cleanup of property as long as the developers did not contribute to the contami-
nation initially. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.175 (West 1995). Ohio provides a
covenant not to sue developers under state environmental laws if developers
retain consultants to oversee a voluntary cleanup and the consultants certify
that the cleanup has been completed. OHIO REV. CODE § 3746.12 (Anderson
1996). However, only 1/3 of the State voluntary cleanup programs that OTA
reviewed in The State of the States on Brownfields provided covenants not to
sue, or similar immunity, to developers. OTA REPORT, supra note 33, at 17
n.39.
Pennsylvania offers developers more liability protection than most states
offer through their voluntary cleanup programs. Under a recently enacted
Pennsylvania law, if a person cleans up a contaminated site to a level that
meets standards established under the law, the person cannot be held liable for
further remediation of the site under any of Pennsylvania's environmental
laws, and cannot be sued by third parties for contribution under those laws.
1995 Pa. Laws 2, § 501. Furthermore, unlike many other states, Penn-
sylvania's law does not allow the state government to require the developer to
conduct any future cleanup at the site if further contamination is discovered,
except in limited circumstances, such as fraud. Id. § 505.
80. OTA REPORT, supra note 33, at 17. In Minnesota, the state can enter
into an agreement to take no action against a landowner under the State
Superfund law when the contamination on the property originates from an ad-
jacent property and the landowner is not otherwise responsible for the release.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.177 (West 1995). The agreement can extend to pro-
spective purchasers of the property if they are not otherwise responsible for the
contamination. Id. Similarly, if a landowner completes an approved voluntary
cleanup of property under Minnesota's voluntary investigation and cleanup pro-
gram, subsequent purchasers of the property can receive the same protection
from liability as the person who conducted the cleanup. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 115B.175 (West 1995). In the same way, if a contaminated property is cle-
aned up under the Pennsylvania or Ohio programs, subsequent purchasers can
be protected from liability to the same extent as the person who conducted the
voluntary cleanup. 1995 Pa. Laws 2, § 501; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.14
(Anderson 1996).
81. See, e.g., 1995 Pa. Laws 3, § 5; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.175 (West
1995).
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courage brownfield redevelopment.8 2  In many programs,
cleanup standards are established for a brownfield based on a
site-specific risk assessment 83 that considers the future land
use of the property.84 Although the standards are often less
stringent than cleanup standards under state Superfund
laws, the standards are still set at levels that protect human
health and the environment.8 5
82. The voluntary cleanup standards may be based on one or more of (1)
EPA guidelines for toxic chemicals; (2) maximum contaminant levels or maxi-
mum contaminant level goals under the Safe Drinking Water Act; (3) water
quality criteria; (4) site specific risk assessment; or (5) background levels. OTA
REPORT, supra note 33, at 15. States are often willing to adopt flexible cleanup
standards for brownfields because they are less contaminated than Superfund
sites. Devine Remarks, supra note 71.
83. Cleanup standards can be set based on site-specific risk assessments
under the California and Ohio voluntary cleanup programs, among others. See
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25398.4 (West 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 3746.04, 3746.07 (Anderson 1996). These site-specific standards are often an
alternate to other uniform cleanup standards. For instance, in Pennsylvania, a
person that conducts a voluntary cleanup can choose to clean the site up to one
of three categories of cleanup standards: (1) background levels; (2) a statewide
health-based standard; or (3) "a site-specific standard that achieves remedia-
tion levels based on a site-specific risk assessment so that any substantial pres-
ent or probable future risk to human health and the environment is eliminated
or reduced to protective levels based upon the present or currently planned fu-
ture use of the property." 1995 Pa. Laws 2, § 301. Once again, though, Penn-
sylvania goes further than most states, in that the flexible cleanup standards
described above apply to compelled remediation under any of Pennsylvania's
environmental laws, and not merely to voluntary brownfield remediation. Id.
§ 106.
84. The future land use of a brownfield can be considered in setting cleanup
standards in several states, including Minnesota, Ohio, and California. See
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25398.4 (West 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3746.04 (Anderson 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.17 (West 1995). For in-
stance, if the groundwater underlying a brownfield will not be used as a drink-
ing water source, the developer will probably not be required to clean up the
groundwater to a level that meets drinking water standards. Similarly, if a
brownfield will be used for industrial purposes with limited public access,
cleanup standards for soil may be reduced. Devine Remarks, supra note 71.
In many cases, though, if a state considers future land use of a brownfield
in setting cleanup standards, the state will impose deed restrictions or other
land use controls on the property to ensure that the property will be used in the
manner that the developer represented when the cleanup standards were es-
tablished. California, Ohio and Minnesota impose such controls on property
when cleanup standards are established based on the future use of the prop-
erty. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25398.7 (West 1995); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3746.05 (Anderson 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.175 (West 1995).
85. Most voluntary cleanup programs set cleanup standards for toxics at
levels at which no adverse effects can be detected for noncancer risks and at
which cancer risks are reduced to 1 in 1 million. OTA REPORT, supra note 33, at
15.
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Some states provide additional financial incentives as
part of voluntary cleanup programs to spur brownfield rede-
velopment.86 Pennsylvania and Michigan, for example, pro-
vide grants to communities to conduct environmental assess-
ments of contamination at brownfields.87 Michigan,
Minnesota and Pennsylvania offer grants and loans to devel-
opers and communities to conduct the actual cleanup of
brownfields8 8 Minnesota and Ohio offer developers a reduc-
tion in property taxes or tax abatement for brownfield proper-
ties that are redeveloped under their voluntary cleanup
programs.8 9
While state voluntary cleanup programs include many
incentives to developers to spur brownfield redevelopment,
the programs also generally require developers to involve the
community in the cleanup and redevelopment decisionmak-
ing process. For instance, if a developer intends to clean up a
site in Pennsylvania to a level that is based on a site-specific
risk assessment, the developer must develop "a public in-
volvement plan which involves the public in the cleanup and
use of the property."90 In addition, the developer must in-
86. Andrew, supra note 34, at 29; OTA REPORT, supra note 33, at 18.
87. Pennsylvania's "Industrial Sites Environmental Assessments Act" cre-
ates a two million dollar Industrial Sites Environmental Assessment Fund, ad-
ministered by the State Department of Commerce, which provides grants for
environmental assessments in distressed communities. 1995 Pa. Laws 4 §§ 3,
4. Similarly, Michigan provides up to ten million dollars for grants for environ-
mental assessments in certain communities. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 13A.19508
(1996).
88. See, e.g., 1995 Pa. Laws 2 § 702; MICH. COMP. LAws § 13A.19508 (1996);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116J.554 (1995).
89. Ohio offers a ten year tax abatement on the increased assessed value of
real and personal property at a redeveloped brownfield. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 5709.57(c)(2), 5709.883 (Anderson 1996). Minnesota offers a reduction in
property taxes to developers with an approved site assessment or cleanup plan.
OTA REPORT, supra note 33, at 20.
90. 1995 Pa. Laws 2 § 304(o). Depending on the site involved, [the public
involvement plan] may include techniques such as developing a proactive com-
munity information and consultation program that includes door step notice of
activities related to remediation, public meetings and roundtable discussions,
convenient locations where documents related to a remediation can be made
available to the public and designating a single contact person to whom commu-
nity residents can ask questions; the formation of a community-based group
which is used to solicit suggestions and comments on the various reports re-
quired by this section; and, if needed, the retention of trained, independent
third parties to facilitate meetings and discussions and perform mediation serv-
ices. Id.
However, the law only requires a public involvement plan if the cleanup
levels for the site will be based on a site-specific risk assessment and the munic-
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clude, in risk assessments and cleanup plans, a plain lan-
guage description of the information in the document "in or-
der to enhance the opportunity for public involvement and
understanding of the remediation process."91
Voluntary cleanup programs encourage landowners and
developers to work cooperatively with state agencies to avoid
some of the costs and delays that would otherwise prevent
brownfield redevelopment. However, state voluntary cleanup
programs cannot remove all of the impediments to brownfield
redevelopment. Even in states that offer developers a cove-
nant not to sue when the developers complete an approved
voluntary cleanup, liability concerns remain a major impedi-
ment to brownfield redevelopment.
While the covenant not to sue protects the developer
from enforcement actions by the state, it does not protect the
developer from contribution suits by third parties under state
environmental laws or toxic tort suits by third parties for con-
tamination from the site.92 It also does not protect the devel-
oper from enforcement of federal environmental laws by fed-
eral authorities. Clearly, if there has been a release of
hazardous substances or other environmental contaminants
at a brownfield, the owner and purchasers of the site may be
held liable under the federal Superfund law and other federal
environmental laws, in addition to state environmental
laws.93 Although it is unlikely that the federal government
will use Superfund to address most brownfields, many land-
owners, lenders and developers argue that potential federal
Superfund liability is the greatest impediment to brownfield
redevelopment. 94
The federal government is, therefore, an essential part-
ner in any effort to encourage environmentally just brown-
field redevelopment. The federal government plays two im-
portant roles. First, the federal government must provide
ipality, rather than any members of the community, requests to be involved in
the remediation and reuse plans for the site. Id. If the site will be cleaned up to
background levels or to uniform state-wide health-based levels, the developer
must only notify the state government and the local municipality regarding the
cleanup, and place a notice in the local paper. 1995 Pa. Laws 2 §§ 302(e),
303(h).
91. 1995 Pa. Laws 2 § 901.
92. OTA REPORT, supra note 33, at 16.
93. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
94. Andrew, supra note 34, at 28; GAO SUPERFUND REPORT, supra note 36,
at 3.
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relief from federal liability to persons that clean up
brownfields to levels that protect human health and the envi-
ronment, and it must provide clarification to lenders and pro-
spective purchasers regarding the extent to which they can
be held liable under federal law if they participate in redevel-
opment of a brownfield.95 Second, the federal government
must provide technical and financial support, and education,
to industries, developers, states and local communities to en-
courage brownfield redevelopment, and to ensure that the
public is involved in brownfield redevelopment decisionmak-
ing in a meaningful manner.96
C. How has the Federal Government Worked with States to
Achieve "Environmentally Just" Brownfield
Redevelopment?
The federal government is developing a successful part-
nership with states to spur brownfield redevelopment with
the full, and informed, participation of affected communities.
The partnership could serve as a model for future federal/
state partnerships to achieve environmental justice, and the
partnership is based on the four principles outlined in the In-
troduction to this article. The following discussion of EPA's
Brownfields Action Agenda recounts those four principles,
and describes how the actions that the federal government
has taken under the Brownfields Action Agenda advance
those principles.
1. Principle Number One: The Federal Government
Must Take Affirmative Steps to Remove Any
Barriers That it has Created to
Environmental Justice.
The Environmental Protection Agency has taken several
actions under the Brownfields Action Agenda that remove
barriers that the federal government created to brownfield
redevelopment. First, EPA removed 24,000 sites from CER-
95. Timothy Fields, Remarks in ABA Satellite Seminar, Brownfields Rede-
velopment: Cleaning Up the Urban Environment (Mar. 7, 1996) [hereinafter
Fields Remarks].
96. Id.; see also OTA REPORT, supra note 33, at 26. EPA has assigned mem-
bers of its staff through intergovernmental personnel assignments to work with
the cities of Detroit, Chicago, Dallas and East Palo Alto in developing brown-
field redevelopment programs. Fields Remarks, supra note 95.
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CLIS (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability System), the list of sites that the federal
government reviews for possible inclusion on the Federal
Superfund List, after the agency determined that it would
not require the sites to be cleaned up under Superfund.9 7
When EPA includes a site in CERCLIS, the listing often cre-
ates a stigma for the site and hinders development of the
site. 98 When the agency removed the sites from CERCLIS, it
removed a psychological barrier to development that it cre-
ated by listing the sites initially.99
The agency removed other federally-created barriers to
brownfield redevelopment when it issued guidance to clarify
the liability of lenders and municipalities under Superfund.
After the Fleet Factors and Kelley decisions, it was unclear
whether lenders that foreclosed on property, or attempted to
protect their security interest in property by requiring mort-
gagees to take steps to avoid hazardous substance contami-
nation on the property, could be held liable under Superfund
as "owners" of the property. Similarly, it was unclear
whether municipal governments that acquired property in-
voluntarily could be held liable under Superfund as "owners"
of the property. Accordingly, municipalities and lenders were
reluctant to take any actions with regard to brownfields that
might subject them to Superfund liability. 10 0
97. See Memorandum from Stephen D. Luftig, Acting Director, Office of
Emergency and Remedial Response, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY TO EPA
REGIONAL HAZARDOUS WASTE PROGRAM DIRECTORS REGARDING REMOVAL OF
NFRAP SITES FROM CERCLIS (1995) reprinted in ABA SEC. NAT. RESOURCES &
ENVTL. LAW, BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT: CLEANING UP THE URBAN ENVI-
RONMENT 25 (1995) [hereinafter CERCLIS Memorandum]. The EPA plans to
remove an additional 3,000 sites from the CERCLIS database. Fields Remarks,
supra note 95.
The EPA removed the sites after it made a determination that the sites
would not be listed on the National Priorities List and that no further remedial
action was planned for the sites ("NFRAP determination") under Superfund at
the time that the sites were evaluated. CERCLIS Memorandum, supra note 97,
at 29. EPA cautions that "[A] NFRAP decision does not mean that there are no
hazardous wastes associated with a given property; it means only that based
upon available information at the time of evaluation, EPA decided not to take
further action under CERCLA." Id.
98. BAA, supra note 31.
99. Id.; see also GAO SUPERFUND REPORT, supra note 36.
100. See, e.g., OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, U.S.
ENVTh. PROTECTION AGENCY, FACT SHEET: THE EFFECT OF SUPERFUND ON IN-
VOLUNTARY ACQUISITIONS OF CONTAMINATED PROPERTY BY GOVERNMENT ENTI-
TIES 1 (1995), reprinted in ABA SEC. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL LAW,
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EPA clarified the liability of lenders and municipalities
in light of Fleet Factors and Kelley in a 1995 "Policy on CER-
CLA Enforcement Against Lenders and Government Entities
that Acquire Property Involuntarily."'"° In the policy, the
agency announced that it will apply the provisions of the
1992 lender liability regulations that were invalidated in Kel-
ley as an enforcement policy. ' 0 2 The policy also provides that
municipalities that acquire property involuntarily 10 3 through
tax delinquency foreclosure, demolition lien foreclosure, es-
cheat, abandonment, condemnation, or eminent domain will
not be pursued as liable parties under Superfund by EPA.' °4
EPA has taken other steps to clarify the Superfund lia-
bility of potential developers that the agency hopes will spur
brownfield redevelopment. The agency recently amended its
guidance on "prospective purchaser agreements" under
Superfund to make the agreements more widely available.1
0 5
BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT: CLEANING UP THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT 77
(1996) [hereinafter OECA FACT SHEET].
101. 60 Fed. Reg. 63,517 (1995). The agency also recently issued regulations
that clarify when a lender may be exempt from liability regarding releases from
underground storage tanks. Underground Storage Tanks-Lender Liability, 60
Fed. Reg. 46,691 (1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts 280 and 281).
102. CERCLA Enforcement Against Lenders and Government Entities that
Acquire Property Involuntarily, 60 Fed. Reg. 63,517, 63,518 (1995). The policy
is, however, merely an enforcement policy, and does not release lenders from
liability under Superfund or protect them from contribution lawsuits by third
parties under Superfund. See OECA FACT SHEET, supra note 100, at 79. How-
ever, EPA believes that if a lender takes the actions that the policy requires
lenders to take to qualify for protection from EPA enforcement, most courts will
conclude that the lender is not an "owner" under Superfund. Id. Superfund
reform legislation that was introduced in the 104th Congress would codify
EPA's lender liability regulations. See H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., § 302 (1995).
103. EPA guidance suggests that "[a] government entity need not be com-
pletely 'passive' in order for the acquisition to be considered 'involuntary' for
purposes of CERCLA." OECA Fact Sheet, supra note 100, at 79.
104. Id. EPA hopes that the policy will facilitate municipalities' plans to re-
develop and broker brownfield sites to prospective purchasers. Id. Once again,
the policy is merely an enforcement policy and does not release municipalities
from liability or protect them from third party contribution lawsuits, but EPA
feels that municipalities that comply with the provisions of the policy will not
be held to be "owners" of property under Superfund. Id.
105. See Agreements with Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated Property
and Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,792 (1995) (gui-
dance). While the amended guidance provides the agency greater flexibility to
enter into prospective purchaser agreements, the agency insists that those
agreements will not result in diminished environmental protection and will not
aggravate the environmental injustice crisis. Id. In the guidance, EPA pro-
vides that:
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Under the policy, EPA, in some cases, enters into an agree-
ment to resolve a prospective purchaser's Superfund liability
before the purchaser buys a contaminated property. Under
the agreement, the purchaser agrees to conduct a specified
cleanup of the property or pay the agency a specific amount of
money in exchange for a covenant from EPA that it will not
pursue any further action against the purchaser under
Superfund for the release at the site, and will protect the pur-
chaser from contribution suits by third parties.
10 6
[tihe agency intends to carefully weigh the public interest considera-
tions of creating jobs in the inner city, where older contaminated in-
dustrial properties are often located, against the possibility of further
environmental degradation of industrial property in mixed industrial/
residential areas. EPA is committed to working with purchasers of
such property, to the extent possible, to ensure proper cleanup and pro-
mote responsible land use.
Id. at 34,794.
In addition, since prospective purchaser agreements aren't covered by Sec-
tion 122 of CERCLA, there is no legal requirement for public notice and com-
ment on the agreement. However, "in light of EPA's new policy of accepting
indirect public benefit as partial consideration, and the fact that the prospective
purchaser agreements will provide contribution protection to the purchaser,"
EPA's policy provides that
the surrounding community and other members of the public should be
afforded the opportunity to comment on the settlement, whenever fea-
sible .... Particularly in urban communities and at facilities where
environmental justice is an issue, Regions should provide sufficient op-
portunities for public information dissemination and facilitate public
input. Seeking cooperation with state and local government may also
facilitate public awareness and involvement. Additionally, Regions
should make a case-by-case determination of the need and level of ad-
ditional measures to ensure meaningful community involvement with
respect to the agreement.
Id. at 34,795.
106. Under the guidance, EPA may enter into an agreement with a prospec-
tive purchaser of contaminated property and provide the purchaser with a cove-
nant not to sue if the following criteria are met: (a) An EPA action at the facility
has been taken, is ongoing, or is anticipated to be undertaken by the agency; (b)
The agency should receive a substantial benefit either in the form of a direct
benefit for cleanup, or as an indirect public benefit in combination with a re-
duced direct benefit to EPA; (c) The continued operation of the facility or new
site development, with the exercise of due care, will not aggravate or contribute
to the existing contamination or interfere with EPA's response action; (d) The
continued operation or new development of the property will not pose health
risks to the community and those persons likely to be present at the site; (e) The
prospective purchaser is financially viable. Agreements with Prospective Pur-
chasers of Contaminated Property and Model Prospective Purchaser Agree-
ment, 60 Fed. Reg. at 34,792-794 (1995).
Because the guidance provides that EPA must receive a substantial benefit
as part of a prospective purchaser agreement, the prospective purchaser must
still generally pay for part of the cleanup costs as a condition of the agreement.
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Many developers will not buy brownfields because they
do not want to be held jointly and severally liable under
Superfund for uncertain, but potentially substantial, cleanup
costs. A developer that enters into a prospective purchaser
agreement, though, knows the extent of its potential liability
before it ever buys the property. Although prospective pur-
chaser agreements may increase the alienability of some
properties, it is unlikely that they will play a significant role
in encouraging brownfield redevelopment, because EPA gen-
erally will only enter into agreements regarding seriously
contaminated sites, rather than traditional brownfields. 10 7
While the initiatives described above are useful first
steps to encourage brownfield redevelopment, there are limits
Id. at 34,794. However, EPA will consider the "indirect benefits" of the redevel-
opment when it determines how much of the cleanup costs it will require the
purchaser to fund under the agreement. Id. Indirect benefits include
measures that serve to reduce substantially the risk posed by the site,
creation or retention of jobs, development of abandoned or blighted
property, creation of conservation or recreation areas, or provision of
community services (such as improved public transportation and infra-
structure). Examples of reduced but measurable benefits to EPA in-
clude partial cleanup or compensation.
Id.
In addition to the covenant not to sue, EPA provides the purchaser with contri-
bution protection under Section 113(f)(2) of CERCLA. Id. at 34,798.
107. Pursuant to the guidance, EPA will only enter into prospective pur-
chaser agreements covering a particular piece of property when an EPA action
has been taken, is ongoing, or is anticipated to be undertaken, on the property.
Agreements with Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated Property and Model
Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. at 34,792, 34,794. Most
brownfields would not, therefore, be candidates for prospective purchaser
agreements.
There are several other reasons why prospective purchaser agreements,
under the current guidance, would not effectively encourage brownfield redevel-
opment. First, the negotiation and approval process for prospective purchaser
agreements is time-consuming, averaging from nine months to a year and a
half, and expensive. Michele B. Corash, Remarks in ABA Satellite Seminar,
Brownfields Redevelopment: Cleaning Up the Urban Environment (Mar. 7,
1996). Second, the agreements only address Superfund liability, and do not
protect prospective purchasers from liability under RCRA, other federal envi-
ronmental laws, or state environmental laws. Id. EPA has only entered into a
few dozen agreements since the agency initially adopted the prospective pur-
chaser guidance.
Congress and the states are addressing some of those limitations. Many
states are beginning to enter into prospective purchaser agreements that pro-
tect purchasers from liability under state environmental laws. Id. Members of
the United States House of Representatives are considering amending
Superfund to exempt prospective purchasers from Superfund liability if they
follow certain procedures before buying property. See H.R. 2500, 104th Cong.,
§ 305 (1995).
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
to what the federal government can accomplish merely by re-
moving barriers created by federal law or the federal govern-
ment. Since the federal and state governments have created
barriers to brownfield redevelopment, the federal government
must encourage states to pursue strategies that remove those
barriers, and must model future federal initiatives on suc-
cessful state programs.
2. Principle Number Two: To the Extent that States or
Local Governments Have Developed Effective
Strategies to Achieve Environmental Justice, the
Federal Government Should Encourage Them to
Pursue Those Strategies, as Long as They Don't
Conflict With Overriding Federal Policies
As part of the Brownfield Action Agenda, EPA is taking
steps to encourage states to develop effective strategies, such
as state voluntary cleanup programs, to spur brownfield rede-
velopment. State voluntary cleanup programs have been an
effective tool to encourage brownfield redevelopment. How-
ever, states cannot protect landowners or developers that vol-
untarily cleanup sites under those programs from liability
under Superfund or other federal environmental laws.
EPA is making those state programs more attractive to
developers and landowners by entering into agreements with
states, whereby EPA agrees that it will not pursue Superfund
enforcement actions at sites that are cleaned up under the
state voluntary cleanup program, unless the site poses an im-
minent threat to human health or the environment.108 EPA
108. EPA and states enter into Superfund Memoranda of Agreement
("SMOA") that define the roles that each play in administering the Federal
Superfund law in the State. Andrew Warren, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Remarks in ABA Satellite Seminar, Brownfields Redevelopment:
Cleaning Up the Urban Environment (Mar. 7, 1996) [hereinafter Warren Inter-
view]. Recently, EPA's regional office in Chicago (EPA Region V) began incor-
porating "comfort language" into the SMOAs with several states to assure the
state that EPA would not pursue Superfund enforcement actions at sites where
landowners or developers are undertaking or have successfully completed an
approved voluntary cleanup under the states' voluntary cleanup program. Id.
The language added to the SMOAs varies from state to state, depending on
the structure of the state's voluntary cleanup program. Id. In some cases, EPA
commits that it will not pursue Superfund enforcement at a site after a site
begins a voluntary cleanup under the state's voluntary cleanup program. Id.
In other cases, EPA commits that it will not pursue Superfund enforcement at a
site after the state certifies that the site has been cleaned up under the state's
voluntary cleanup program. Id. The language in the SMOA between EPA and
1996]
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will not enter into an agreement with a state unless the state
voluntary cleanup program protects human health and the
environment and ensures that affected communities are in-
volved in the cleanup decisionmaking process. This partner-
ship between EPA and the states clearly illustrates the bene-
fits of cooperative federalism in the struggle to achieve
environmental justice. 1 o9
3. Principle Number Three: The Federal Government
Should Adopt Successful State Environmental
Justice Initiatives on the Federal Level, and Make
Legislative and Regulatory Changes Based on Those
Successful Initiatives
While states have taken the lead in developing programs
to encourage brownfield redevelopment, the federal govern-
ment has recently begun to model federal initiatives on suc-
cessful state initiatives. For instance, President Clinton re-
cently announced his support for tax reform to encourage
brownfield redevelopment, 110 and several brownfield tax in-
Indiana, for example, provides that "[alt sites successfully completing a
remediation under the VRP, Region V does not plan or anticipate any federal
action under the Superfund law (CERCLA) unless, in exceptional circum-
stances, the site poses an imminent threat to human health and the environ-
ment." U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, REGION V & INDIANA DEPT. OF ENVI-
RONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SUPERFUND MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ADDENDUM
2 (1995), reprinted in ABA SEC. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL LAW, BROWNFIELDS
REDEVELOPMENT: CLEANING UP THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT 123, 124 (1996).
Prior to incorporating "comfort language" into SMOAs, EPA would send
"comfort letters" to individual developers, in which the agency indicated that it
did not plan any Superfund enforcement action at the time. Warren Interview,
supra. EPA still follows that approach in states where the agency has not in-
corporated "comfort language" into the SMOA.
109. There are, however, limits to the effectiveness of this approach. First,
EPA does not offer landowners or developers a covenant not to sue, contribution
protection or other protection from Superfund liability under this approach.
Warren Interview, supra note 108. The agency merely makes a commitment to
the state, rather than the landowner or developer, that it will not pursue a
Superfund enforcement action for releases from the site. Id. Furthermore,
EPA retains its authority to enforce RCRA and other federal environmental
laws at the site. Id. Recently, though, EPA has suggested that it might add
provisions to the memoranda of agreement that it negotiates with states re-
garding RCRA enforcement that would encourage brownileld redevelopment
and provide for reduced EPA oversight of some brownfields. Id.
110. The brownfield tax proposal was one of the few environmental initia-
tives that the President discussed in his 1996 State of the Union Address. Pres-
ident Clinton, 1996 State of the Union Address (visited Jan. 23, 1996) <http://
wwwl.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/other/challenge.html#environment>. The
President announced a $2 billion, seven year brownfield tax incentive program
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centive bills have been introduced in Congress. 11 Congress
is also considering legislation that would provide grants and
loans to state and local governments to conduct site assess-
ments or cleanups at brownfields.
1 2
In addition, many of the administrative reforms that
EPA is making to Superfund mirror successful state initia-
tives. EPA recently issued a directive that encourages
greater consideration of future land use in selection of a
cleanup method for Superfumd sites."' The directive stresses
the need for early and active community participation in the
cleanup selection process, 1 4 and the potential need for deed
restrictions and similar land use controls when cleanup
as part of the proposed 1997 budget. See Clinton Unveils Tax Incentive Plan to
Restore 30,000 Brownfield Sites, 26 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2140-41 (Mar. 15, 1996).
Under the plan, a person could fully deduct all of the cleanup costs that they
spent at a brownfield in the year that they incurred the costs. Id. The deduc-
tion would only be available, though, for EPA's brownfield pilot projects, de-
scribed infra, and for sites that are located in communities where the poverty
rate is greater than 20 percent. Id. White House officials claim that the plan
will spur $10 billion in private investment and address 30,000 brownfields. Id.
111. See, e.g., H.R. 3747, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 3241, 104th Cong. (1996);
H.R. 2846, 104th Cong. (1996); S. 1911, 104th Cong. (1996).
112. See, H.R. 3214, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 3093, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R.
2742, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 2178, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 1285, 104th Cong.
(1995).
113. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND
EMERGENCY RESPONSE, DIRECTIVE REGARDING LAND USE IN THE CERCLA REM-
EDY SELECTION PROCESS (1995), reprinted in ABA SEC. NAT. RESOURCES &
ENVTL. LAW, BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT: CLEANING UP THE URBAN ENVi-
RONMENT 65 (1996) [hereinafter OSWER DIRECTIVE]. The directive provides
that
[reasonably anticipated future use of the land at National Priorities
List sites is an important consideration in determining the appropriate
extent of remediation. Future use of the land will affect the types of
exposure and the frequency of exposures that may occur to any
residual contamination remaining on the site, which in turn affects the
nature of the remedy chosen.
Id. at 67 (emphasis added).
The directive does not address the extent to which the future use of ground-
water should be considered in CERCLA remedy selection. Id. at 68.
114. In the directive, EPA notes that "early community involvement, with a
particular focus on the community's desired future uses of property associated
with the CERCLA site, should result in a more democratic decisionmaking pro-
cess; greater community support for remedies selected as a result of this pro-
cess; and more expedited, cost-effective cleanups." Id. at 65. The directive also
provides that "ti]f the site [being cleaned up] is likely to have environmental
justice concerns, extra efforts should be made to reach out and consult with
segments of the community that are not necessarily reached by conventional
communication vehicles or through local officials and planning commissions."
Id. at 65.
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methods are selected based on future land use.' 15 The agency
is also developing streamlined risk assessment procedures for
specific types of brownfield properties, such as steel mills, to
facilitate the selection of cleanup methods based on site-spe-
cific risk assessments.' 16 Finally, the agency is developing a
joint policy with states on voluntary cleanup programs, which
should provide valuable guidance to states regarding how to
administer an environmentally protective and environmen-
tally just voluntary cleanup program." 7
4. Principle Number Four: The Federal Government
Should Continue to Support State and Local
Environmental Justice Initiatives by Providing
Funding, Technical Expertise and Research
Assistance for Those Initiatives
The last major component of EPA's Brownfield Action
Agenda is a federal grant program to encourage brownfield
redevelopment. The agency is providing grants of up to
$200,000 to 76 communities across the United States to fund
Brownfield Pilot Projects."" The grants can be used for site
assessment, cleanup and redevelopment planning, and actual
cleanup of brownfields." 9 EPA believes that the grants will
encourage communities, investors, lenders, developers, and
115. The directive provides
If any remedial alternative developed during the [feasibility study] will
require a restricted land use in order to be protective, it is essential
that the alternative include components that will ensure that it remain
protective.... A variety of institutional controls may be used such as
deed restrictions and deed notices, and adoption of land use controls by
a local government .... Where waste is left on-site at levels that would
require limited use and restricted exposure, EPA will conduct reviews
at least every five years to monitor the site for any changes.... Should
land use change, it will be necessary to evaluate the implications of
that change for the selected remedy, and whether the remedy remains
protective.... EPA... retains its authority to take further response
action where necessary to ensure protectiveness.
Id. at 73-74.
116. Fields Remarks, supra note 95.
117. See Voluntary Guidance on Brownfields Expected, 26 ENV'T REP. (BNA)
2106 (1996).
118. U.S. E.P.A., Brownfields Pilots (visited Nov. 18, 1996) <http://
www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/pilot.htm>. See also Fields Remarks, supra note 95.
119. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND
EMERGENCY RESPONSE, BROWNFIELDS NATIONAL PILOTS: QUICK REFERENCE
FACT SHEET, reprinted in ABA Sec. Nat. Resources & Envtl. Law, Brownfields
Redevelopment: Cleaning Up the Urban Environment 297 (1996).
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state and local governments to work together to develop crea-
tive ways to redevelop brownfields. 12 ° Many of the projects
explore ways to remove regulatory barriers to redevelopment
without sacrificing environmental protection. 121 Those pro-
grams can then be used as models for brownfield redevelop-
ment in other sites across the nation. The agency also be-
lieves that communities will be able to use the grants to
leverage significant amounts of private redevelopment capi-
tal, which can be used to spur redevelopment of the property,
creating new jobs and increasing the communities' tax
base. 122
VI. CONCLUSION
Although it may be too early to definitively measure the
success of federal and state brownfield redevelopment pro-
grams, initial reactions to the programs have been positive.
The federal government and state governments seem to be
working cooperatively to address the impediments to brown-
field redevelopment that are within their respective realms,
and fostering the efforts of their governmental counterparts
in a manner that highlights the benefits of true cooperative
federalism.
120. Id. The criteria that the agency uses to select the national pilot projects
include
(1) effect of brownfields on the community or communities; (2) value
added by federal support; (3) existing local government structure; (4)
community involvement plan; (5) environmental justice plan; (6) ap-
propriate authority and government support; (7) proposed cleanup
funding mechanisms; (8) flow of ownership plan; (9) environmental site
assessment plan; (10) national replicability; (11) measure of success.
Id.
121. Id.
122. EPA awarded the grant for the first pilot project to Cuyahoga County,
Ohio in 1993. Fields Remarks, supra note 95. The county used the $200,000
grant to leverage $3.5 million in private capital, which was used to clean up and
redevelop an abandoned industrial complex. Id. The redevelopment increased
the county's tax base by $1 million and created 171 new jobs. Id. While the
national pilot projects seem to be achieving the ambitious goals described
above, some environmental justice advocates have argued that the process that
EPA uses to select the communities that will serve as pilot projects favors big
cities over small communities. In a recent interview, the director of NAACP's
environmental justice program argued that the application process disadvan-
tages small communities, since major cities have the resources to prepare eye-
catching applications, while small communities often have barely enough re-
sources to complete the application. Rosenthal Interview, supra note 45.
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The Brownfield Action Agenda incorporates the princi-
ples for federal/state cooperation in environmental justice ini-
tiatives that were described in the introduction to this article
and can serve as the model for further federal/state environ-
mental justice initiatives. For instance, the federal govern-
ment can take steps to facilitate and encourage the develop-
ment and use of SEPAs12 3 in the quest for environmental
justice, and model legislative and administrative changes to
NEPA'24 on those successful state initiatives.
125
Similarly, the federal government could facilitate the
continued refinement of state pollution prevention and toxics
use reduction programs, and model changes to the Federal
Pollution Prevention Act of 1990126 on those state pro-
grams.127 State laws that limit the siting of hazardous facili-
ties and facilitate meaningful public participation could pro-
vide the template for changes to RCRA 128 that would reduce
environmental injustice. Finally, although it is extremely
unlikely that it would do so, Congress could even model fu-
ture federal environmental justice legislation on state laws
that guarantee each person the right to a clean environ-
ment.129 Regardless of what steps the federal government
and state governments take next to advance environmental
justice, their cooperative approach to brownfield redevelop-
ment can be a model for future successful initiatives.
123. SEPA is the generic name that many commentators use to refer to state
environmental review laws that are modeled on the National Environmental
Policy Act. See, e.g., DANIEL P. SELMI & KENNETH A. MANASTER, STATE ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW § 10.01 (Supp. 1995); Reich, supra note 13, at 306.
124. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-70
(1994).
125. The author addresses these issues in a forthcoming article.
126. 42 U.S.C. §§ 13101-09 (1994).
127. For a critique of the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 in light of state
initiatives, see Stephen M. Johnson, From Reaction to Proaction: The 1990 Pol-
lution Prevention Act, 17 COLUM. J. ENVT'L. L. 153 (1992).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 6901-92 (1994).
129. See, e.g. PA. CONST., art. 1 § 27.
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